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A CASE OF TREASONOUS INTERPRETATION*
W. T. BROTHERTON, JR.**
The judicial opinion that follows attempts to illustrate four ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation in the context of one of
the Constitution's clearest provisions. While I do not agree with all
of the views propounded by the honorable justices of the hypo-
thetical court, I hope by this exercise to facilitate an understanding
of the variety of legitimate approaches, and their effect on the out-
come of even the most clear-cut case.
In the Supreme Court of North Virginia
STATE OF NORTH VIRGINIA
V.
JIM BOND
Justice Thurlow delivers the opinion of the court and is joined by
Justice Weed. Justice Whitestone concurs in a separate opinion, and
Justices Caskey and Brown dissent and file separate opinions.
Thurlow, Justice:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Wash-
ington County, without a jury, finding the appellant, Jim Bond,
guilty of treason.' The issue on appeal is one of constitutional inter-
* The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of his former law clerk, R. Louis Harrison,
Jr., in the preparation of this article. The format employed is not original, and was used most notably
in Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616 (1949).
** Washington & Lee University (AB) (LLB). Actively involved in the practice of law in West
Virginia from 1950 until elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1984. Former
Assistant, Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney's office. Elected to the West Virginia House of
Delegates in 1952, 1954, 1956, 1958, 1960 and 1962. Elected to the West Virginia Senate in 1964,
1968, 1972 and 1976. Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary at the 1958 Session and
both House Majority Leader and Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee 1960 through 1964.
Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee 1968 through 1970. Senate Majority Leader and Chairman
of Senate Judiciary Committee 1970 through 1972. Elected President of the West Virginia Senate in
1972 and served in that capacity through 1980.
1 While it is admittedly unusual for a treason case to originate in state court, there was no
objection from either party, and this court is competent to try the issue. Therefore, we hold that the
matter is properly before us. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973) (state courts
are appropriate forums in which federal questions and federal crimes may at times be tried); Boston
Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977) (state courts of general jurisdiction
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pretation. After review of the record and the briefs, a majority of
this court has voted to affirm.
Jim Bond is a civilian employee at Fort Early in Washington
County. For the past year, Mr. Bond has been under surveillance
by an agent of the North Virginia Bureau of Investigation
("N.V.B.I.") on the suspicion that he was selling secrets to agents
of a foreign power intent on the destruction of the United States.
The prosecution's evidence at trial consisted solely of the testimony
of the N.V.B.I. agent and video tapes taken by the N.V.B.I. agent
which contained remarkably good video and audio recordings of Mr.
Bond receiving money in return for blueprints of several types of
nuclear weapons. The agent conducted the investigation alone, and
he was the only person to witness the crime. The tapes verified his
testimony and the evidence left no doubt as to Mr. Bond's guilt.
For his defense, Mr. Bond relied on article III, section 3 of the
United States Constitution, which provides that treason may be found
only by confession or upon the testimony of two witnesss. 2 In this
case, we have one witness and the video tapes taken by him. We,
therefore, must consider whether the lack of a second witness ex-
onerates Mr. Bond despite overwhelming evidence of his guilt.
I.
WE THm PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States
of America.,
The preamble to the United States Constitution lists the lofty
goals and aspirations of the men who formed our system of gov-
ernment. The Constitution is the cornerstone of that government
and was designed to endure as long as the fledgling nation. 4
have power to decide cases involving federal constitutional rights where neither Constitution nor statute
withdraws such jurisdiction).
2 Article III, section 3 of the United States Constitution provides in part that "[n]o Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or
on Confession in open Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
U.S. CONST. preamble.
4 The Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 415 (1819).
[Vol. 90
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Nevertheless, even men as discerning as the drafters of our Con-
stitution could not see into the future. Realizing this limitation, we
cannot expect a document written in 1787 to address precisely the
issues we face today. When the drafters wrote of warrantless searches,
could they have envisioned X-rays or wiretapping? When they spoke
of freedom of religion, could they have considered tax deductions
for gifts to a television evangelist building a large amusement park?
Would the advent of nuclear weapons have affected their decision
on the right to keep and bear arms? What about the effect of sub-
marine-launched ballistic missiles on the authority of Congress to
declare war?
The list of developments affecting the ability of an eighteenth
century document to govern the United States in the twentieth cen-
tury is a long one. By their letter, many provisions of the Consti-
tution are antiquated and obsolete. The words alone can no longer
be expected to rule the complex society that has evolved from the
original thirteen states.
What breathes life into the Constitution is the spirit captured by
the drafters and embodied between the lines of the document. The
spirit of the Constitution is reflected in goals enumerated in the
preamble, 5 and exhibited throughout the remainder of the document.
These goals are as worthy today as they were in 1787. It is this
spirit that the founders of our nation intended to govern the United
States of the future. It is this spirit that this court should use in
applying the Constitution to the complex problems of modern so-
ciety. We, therefore, should not chain ourselves to the literal lan-
guage of an antiquated document any more than we should give up
modern technological advances and go back to the horse and plow.
By using the spirit of the document to interpret its letter, we can
adapt the Constitution to govern a changing society.
The United States Supreme Court often expands the Constitution
beyond its literal meaning in order to implement its intent. In Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,6 for example, Justice Douglas, for the Court,
recognized that the Constitution does not guarantee citizens a "right
'See e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1987]
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of privacy" in so many words. The Court nevertheless found such
a right, based on the "zone of privacy" created by several fun-
damental constitutional guarantees in the Bill of Rights. 7 Justice
Douglas, in his observation that "specific guarantees in the Bill of
Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance," '8 acknowledged that
the spirit of the Constitution, as well as its letter, may be the source
of constitutional law.
Those who would advocate interpreting the document strictly by
its letter claim that they are protecting the integrity of the original
Constitution. In truth, a literal interpretation would destroy the vi-
tality of the document. Its meaning would be limited to the situations
that it addresses specifically. In a modern world, these would be
increasingly few. The Constitution is analogous to a blueprint for
a building. The blueprint shows where the main beams will go, the
layout of the building, and other important details necessary to con-
struct the building. The architect does not attempt to show the place-
ment of every brick or the location of every nail. Similarly, the
Constitution is the blueprint or master plan of our government. "We
do not expect to find in a constitution minute details. It is necessarily
brief and comprehensive. It prescribes outlines, leaving the filling
up to be deduced from the outlines." 9
II.
A literal reading of article III, section 3 would require us to
release this defendant, whom we know without any doubt to be
guilty of treason. The words of article III, section 3 require two
witnesses, and only one witness testified. We must look beyond the
letter of the Constitution, however, and implement the intent of the
framers, who could not have foreseen video tapes. The requirement
of two witnesses kept treason from being lightly charged, and en-




Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 547, 532 (1871).
10 See generally Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24, 30 (1945).
[Vol. 90
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In this case, we have the testimony of one witness, supported
by video tapes of the acts to which he testified. Together, this evi-
dence accomplishes the founders' goals. The agent's testimony may
be tested not only through cross-examination, but also by reference
to the tapes. The defendant can challenge the "credibility" of the
tapes by having an expert examine them for signs of editing. Modern
advances in audio and video recording have preserved Mr. Bond's
crime so that the court itself can watch the crime occur. Indeed, in
some ways a video tape and one witness provide far more satis-
factory evidence than two witnesses.
Mr. Bond's conviction for treason based on the evidence pre-
sented offends neither the spirit of article III, section 3 nor its intent.
We see no reason, therefore, to reverse the conviction based on a
strict reading of the treason provision, and the decision of the Circuit
Court of Washington County is affirmed."
Affirmed.
Whitestone, Justice, concurring:
While I agree with my brothers in the majority on the result in
this case, I differ on the rationale. From their opinion they seem
to believe that the Constitution is so antiquated that the only way
to adapt it to modern times is to break the spirit away from the
flesh and to rely on the spirit alone. I disagree. "In expounding the
Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due
force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole
instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used or needlessly
added.' ' The spirit is embodied in the letter and the two need not
11 It is true that the Supreme Court traditionally has used the spirit of the Constitution as a
vehicle to expand the liberties set out in the document, and not to diminish them. See, e.g., Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to privacy in marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right
to privacy in context of abortions); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (protection against
unreasonable searches). Once it has been resolved that a court may read between the lines of the
Constitution, however, the axe can fall both ways. In this case, our reading of the spirit of the
document may be seen as restricting the rights of one accused of treason. We do not believe, however,
that we have diminished the protection afforded by the rule requiring two (human) witnesses. Our
holding should not, therefore, be read as authority for restricting rights expressly granted by the
Constitution.
HZ Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840).
1987]
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be severed in this case when they can be reconciled through con-
struction.
Over the years courts have developed canons of construction
which help determine the meaning of ambiguous provisions. Words
should be used in their natural sense; 3 construed with the Consti-
tution's purpose in mind; 14 read in connection with other provisions
of the Constitution covering the same subject; 5 and harmonized with
seemingly conflicting parts.' 6 Later provisions should control over
earlier ones 7 and specific provisions over general ones. 18 Words and
clauses should be construed broadly, rather than narrowly. 9 These
rules of construction are common sense guidelines which can be
summarized in one word: reasonable. As long as we interpret the
words of the Constitution in a reasonable fashion, taking into ac-
count the inevitable changes in the nation it created, the document
will be a viable, useful tool.
The majority erred in concluding that it must ignore the language
of the Constitution in order to interpret its spirit. is it reasonable
to interpret a document governing today as if the date were 1787?
Of course not. Had the majority taken a reasonable approach, using
the appropriate canons of construction, there would have been no
need to disregard the Constitution's language.
The Constitution states that there must be two witnesses to the
crime of treason. The majority hastily assumed that only one human
being was present, and, therefore, there were not two witnesses. A
witness is "one who, being present, personally sees or perceives a
thing... [and] one who testifies to what he has seen, heard, or
otherwise observed.''20 Thus, a witness must satisfy two require-
ments. He must be present and able to see or perceive, and he must
be able to testify.
" See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Leessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 326 (1816).
" See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824).
IS See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
16 See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Jordan, 104 Ariz. 193, 196, 450 P.2d 383, 386 (1969).
" Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68-89 (1904).
IS City of Tulsa v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 75 F.2d 343, 351, cert. denied, 295 U.S. 744
(1935).
11 See In Re Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 330 (1905).
BLACK's LAW DicnoNaRY 1438 (5th ed. 1979).
[Vol. 90
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In the eighteenth century there was only one mechanism on earth
that could see and testify, and that was a human being. The twen-
tieth century has changed that. Video cameras are able to see, hear,
and, most importantly, testify. Video tapes can be examined by ex-
perts for tampering or distortion, fulfilling the need for a check on
credibility. A tape allows the judge or jury to see the crime in a
way that is clearer than any image a witness could possibly convey,
no matter how skillful his command of the language. I see no reason,
therefore, why the term "witness" in article III, section 3 cannot
be construed to include a video tape.
The definitions of several constitutional phrases have changed
over time. "Equal protection" once was read to mean "separate
but equal." 21 As a society we have long since discarded that notion.22
The "unreasonable searches and seizures" prohibited by the fourth
amendment originally encompassed only searches of places. 23 With
the advent of wiretapping and ultra-sensitive microphones, however,
the Supreme Court has read the fourth amendment to protect people
also. 24 The phrase which has undergone perhaps the greatest met-
amorphosis is "cruel and unusual punishment." Methods of pun-
ishment routinely employed at the time the Constitution was ratified
would shock even the most severe sentencing judge today. As late
as 1878, the Supreme Court upheld a ruling sentencing a man to
be publicly shot under a Utah statute that authorized punishment
by shooting, hanging, or beheading.25 Today the Court reads the
eighth amendment to prohibit punishments which "'involve the un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain,' or are grossly dispropor-
tionate to the severity of the crime, "26 as well as punishments that
are physically barbarous. 27 For example, within the last thirty years,
the Supreme Court has declared as cruel and unusual Arkansas prison
21 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 132, 136-37 (1878).
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)),
2 Id. (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
19871
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conditions, 28 the denial of medical care, 29 and the denaturalization
of an army soldier.
30
The Supreme Court, in eighth amendment cases, has authorized
expressly a modern as opposed to a historical interpretation of the
Constitution, noting that the eighth amendment "is not fastened to
the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice. ' 31 It "draw[s] its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a ma-
turing society.' '32 Likewise the meaning of "witness" can change by
virtue of modern technological advances.
Many will argue that broadening the language of the Constitution
in this way was not the intent of the framers. They will argue that
the drafters could not possibly have intended the term "witnesses"
to include video cameras, because such cameras did not exist in the
eighteenth century. This argument illustrates why the specific intent
of the framers should be no more than a secondary tool in con-
stitutional interpretation. In most cases the circumstances have
changed so much that the framers, in truth, had no intent regarding
modern issues. To try to use the original intent of the framers freezes
the law in the 1700's and, as the majority stated, antiquates the
entire document.
Interpreting the language of the Constitution broadly to reflect
changes in the world around us results in a reasonable interpretation
of the treason provision. I would hold that a video camera can be
a witness under article III, section 3 of the United States Consti-
tution. There being one human witness present and one mechanical
witness present, the requirements of the Constitution are satisfied
in this case, and I would affirm Mr. Bond's conviction.
Caskey, Justice, dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in
this case because I do not believe it gave due deference to the opin-
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
10 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
11 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
32 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
[Vol. 90
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ions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution
provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested
in the Supreme Court.3 The judicial power is the power to hear
cases3 4 and interpret law. It is the power to declare what the law
is.35 Thus, the Supreme Court, being established in the Constitution
as the the highest court having the judicial power,36 is the supreme
interpreter of federal law. The Constitution itself is, of course, fed-
eral law. 37 Interpretations of law are not new law, but clearer state-
ments of existing law.38 Therefore, interpretations of the Constitution
by the United States Supreme Court are the clearest statements of
the Constitution.
The importance of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting
the Constitution cannot be overestimated. The decisions of the Su-
preme Court put flesh on the document's bony frame. They bring
additional meaning to the document and energize the words so that
they are as viable today as they were in 1787. For example, the
Court decided in Roe v. Wade,39 that prohibiting abortions may be
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court did not interpret a specific
constitional provision that prevents a state from prohibiting abor-
tions. There is no such provision. It relied instead on the right of
personal privacy based on the fourteenth amendment, among oth-
ers. 40 Thus, although the Constitution provides neither an express
right of personal privacy nor the inclusion therein of the abortion
decision, we all acknowledge that the Constitution protects a wom-
an's right to seek an abortion during the first trimester of her preg-
nancy.4
1
There are may who feel that Roe v. Wade was a bad decision.
Error it may have been, but no lower court and no other branch
11 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
:4 See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
1 Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
3' See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
" See id. art. VI.
" Cf. Ming v. Pratt, 22 Mont. 262, 265, 56 P. 279, 280 (1899) (interpretation makes intelligible
what was previously unclear).
31 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 (1973).
40 Id. at 153-55.
"1 See id. at 163-64.
1987]
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of government may overrule the Supreme Court's decision. If the
case before us concerned abortion, we would not be free to look
to the Constitution and conclude, however rationally, that it does
not address the subject of abortions. By the same token, I believe
that the majority's relegation of Cramer v. United States42 to a foot-
note improperly ignored controlling precendent in this case.
In Cramer, the Supreme Court stated that "[e]very act, move-
ment, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute treason
must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses. ' 43 The Court
in Cramer explained that once the two-witness requirement is met,
the prosecution can present "corroborative or cumulative evidence
of any admissible character either to strenghten a direct case or to
rebut the testimony or inferences on behalf of defendant." 44 That
the two-witness rule requires testimony by two humans is implicit
in the distinction the Court made between the satisfaction of the
two-witness requirement by the testimony of two witnesses, and once
that requirement is met, the admission of corroborative or cumu-
lative evidence of any admissible character. I believe that the video
tapes in this case, although admissible, constitute corroborative or
cumulative evidence and do not constitute a witness for purposes
of satisfying article III, section 3.
The issue in this case is within scope of Cramer's interpre-
tation of the constitutional provision, and therfore this court is not
free to re-examine its meaning. For this reason, I note my dissent.
Brown, Justice, dissenting:
Our founding fathers, when drafting the Constitution, were not
able to put the Constitution into effect immediately at the end of
the convention. They did not have the power. The power to ratify
the Constitution rested always in the people. The Constitution was
a contract made by the residents of this country, giving their linited
permission to be governed under a certain set of rules. The Con-
42 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
" Id. at 34-35; see also Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 736 (1952) ("Two witnesses
are required not to the disloyal and treacherous intention but to the same overt act.").
" Cramer, 325 U.S. at 35.
[Vol. 90
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stitution was the offer. The acceptance was ratification by the peo-
ple, through their appointed representives. The consideration was a
limited surrender of power by the people in exchange for more ef-
ficient system of government. The result was a social contract which
would be the ultimate source of all power residing in the new gov-
ernment. We should interpret this social contract with the respect
that it deserves. Unfortunately, the majority has not.
The majority calls the words of the Constitution antiquated. It
fails to note that most of the Constitution works quite well without
heroic methods of interpretation. Of course, there parts of the doc-
ument which have been made obsolete by the passage of time. Never-
theless, the power to amend the Constitution was not given to the
courts by the people. Only the people, through the amendment proc-
ess, can approve any changes in the Constitution, no matter how
desperately changes are needed. 45 In his dissenting opinion in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, Justice Black stated:
I realize that many good and able man have eloquently spoken and written, some-
times in rhapsodical strains, about the duty of this Court to keep Constitution
in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from
time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes.
For myself, I must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution
makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested
by the people's elected representatives can be submitted to the people or their
selected agents for ratification. That method of change was good for our Fathers,
and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is good enough for me.-
The majority, in the guise of interpreting the Constitution's spirit,
usurps a great deal of power that the people specifically reserved
to themselves, i.e., the power to amend.47
The concurring opinion is little better. Instead of breaking away
from the language, it tortures the language, bending it into new
shapes never conceived by the founders. The words of the Consti-
tution, like the words of contract, should be given their obvious
and ordinary meaning. No amount of creative interpretation will
convince me that "witnesses" means anything other than people.
41 See U.S. CONsT. art. V.
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black J., dissenting).
" See U.S. CONST. art. V.
19871
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. This is not to say that a court has no power to interpret the
Constitution. There are certain places in the document where a court
may properly roam. The fourth amendment talks about "unrea-
sonable" searches and seizures. The fourteenth amendment prohibits
any state from depriving any citizens of life, liberty, or property
without "due process" of law. The eight amendment proscribes
"cruel and unusual" punishment. 48 These phrases are imprecise and
capable of being interpreted differently over time. Article III, section
3, however, is not such a passage. In this case, the majority arti-
ficially creates an ambiguity. The text speaks of two witnesses, ob-
viously meaning human witnesses. We should accept this clear
mandate. If modern technological advances have rendered the two-
witness requirement unnecessary, it is up to the people, through
their representatives, to amend the provision.
Although I am pleased to be joined by another dissenter, I feel
compelled also to qualify Justice Caskey's view of the Supreme Court
as sole arbiter of what the Constitution means. Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court cannot transcend the provisions of the
Constitution itself. The Constitution established the Supreme Court.
Where the two conflict, the Constitution is superior. Supporters of
the Supreme Court assert that when the Court interprets the Con-
stitution, its interpretations are merely clearer statements of the doc-
ument itself. I disagree. Interpretations should be clearer statements
of the document interpreted. Interpretations are sometimes wrong.
The Supreme Court, like any other branch of government, is capable
of usurping power not granted to it by the Constitution. Every po-
litical entity will stretch its powers until it is checked. Recognizing
this, the framers of the Constitution set up a system of checks and
balances among three separate branches.
The Supreme Court has the power to decide cases. It can neither
enact laws nor enforce them. 49 It often must consider cases in which
an act of Congress or an administrative action appears to conflict
with the Constitution. In such cases, the Court gives great deference
41 These ambiguities are places where the framers made no attempt to set out specifics, but
intentionally gave the courts discretion to "fill in" the law.
41 See Ti FEDERALIST No. 78 at 99 (A. Hamilton) (M. W. Dunne ed. 1901).
[Vol. 90
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to the decisions of other governmental entities.50 Nevertheless, if the
conflict is clear, the Court must enforce the Constitution." Thus,
even though the Court itself is not superior to the other branches
of government, its interpretation of the Constitution acts as a check
on the executive and legislative branches.
The situation is reversed when the President or Congress is faced
with a possible conflict between a Supreme Court opinion and the
Constitution. Each should give due deference to the Court, recog-
nizing its traditional role as the guardian of the Constitution. The
President and the members of Congress took an oath to support
the Constitution, however, not the Supreme Court. If, therefore, a
Supreme Court decision violates the Constitution, the other branches
of government must disregard it.52 There are those who claim that
acknowledging the ability of Congress or the President to defy an
unconstitutional Supreme Court decision would render the Court's
opinions meaningless, because no decision would be final. That po-
sition is no more tenable than saying that executive and legislative
decisions are meaningless because they are subject to judicial re-
view.53 In fact, the power of review of judicial decisions has been
exercised on rare occasion, and it has not destroyed the power of
the Court.5 4
We are faced with the unpleasant prospect of releasing a man
unquestionably guilty of treason, because of what many would call
o See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).
" See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969).
2 In a letter to John Adams' wife, Abigail, explaining why he had pardoned many people who
had been convicted under the Sedition Act for libeling John Adams, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
[T]he executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, were bound to remit the execution
of it because that power had been confined to them by the Constitution. That instrument
meant that its coordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional and what are not, not
only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the legislature and executive also
in their spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch.
F. MuRPHY, J. FL nmIG, W. HaRbs, AimsaucAN CoNsTrm oNA. INTERPRaTATION 190 (1986).
" The power of judicial review has been accepted ever since Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803).
-' President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce an order of the Supreme Court in the famous
Cherokee Indian case of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Jackson's attitude was
"John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A
Study of Law, Politics and Morality, 21 STAN. L. RaV. 500, 525 (1969). Despite the action, the
judiciary remained a powerful branch of government.
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an outdated requirement of the Constitution. Nevertheless, it is bet-
ter to let one treasonous citizen go free than to torture the Con-
stitution with strained interpretations. I believe Mr. Bond must be
freed, and I therefore note my dissent.
Epilogue
For two hundred years judges on courts throughout the United
States have advocated different constructions of the same consti-
tutional language. That the original document has survived countless
interpretations, with very few amendments, and has continued to
function as the ultimate source of law in a major world power is
testimony both to the foresight of its drafters and to the flexibility
they built into many constitutional provisions.
Interpretational debates such as the one engaged in by the Su-
preme Court of North Virginia will continue. This is desirable and
in fact essential for the continued vitality of the United States Con-
stitution. As long as both the courts and "we the people" continue
our efforts to interpret the words written by the members of the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, the United States Constitution
will stand as the cornerstone of our government.
[Vol. 90
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss1/4
